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Brad Sullivan. Wordsworth and the Composition of Knowledge: Re-
figuring Relationships Among Minds, Worlds, and Words. New 
York: Peter Lang, 2000. ISBN 0-8204-4857-5. xvi + 202 pp. $50.95. 
 
 Many are the scholars who have sought to explicate Wordsworth’s philoso-
phy, teasing out from the poetry definitions of terms such as “Nature,” “Imagi-
nation,” and “Reason” and gleaning the underlying system of thought that con-
nects them. Such accounts are often supported by detailed arguments about the 
influence of Coleridge and the philosophers, both German and English, whom 
that poet read so avidly and discussed with his friend and Lake District neighbor 
in the late 1790s. Given Wordsworth’s reluctance to address such subjects di-
rectly, this persistent attention to his philosophy might seem nothing short of 
extraordinary—except that, especially in poems like The Prelude, Wordsworth 
clearly is placing his poetical meditations within the context of philosophers as 
diverse as Kant and Hartley. Nevertheless, attempts to find a logical and coher-
ent system of philosophy within his poetry often seem remarkably sterile in con-
trast with the actual experience of reading the poetry. Within the past several 
decades, however, Wordsworthians have begun to look at the contradictions and 
inconsistencies in Wordsworth’s writing and have started to ponder the possibil-
ity that these apparent weaknesses may indeed be part of a way of seeing, more 
elusive than a systematic philosophy but no less logical once its terms are under-
stood.  
 Brad Sullivan’s Wordsworth and the Composition of Knowledge is a contri-
bution to this revisionary approach to the subject. Sullivan’s reconstructive en-
terprise, as he calls it, focuses specifically on Wordsworth’s concept of 
knowledge, which has been misunderstood heretofore because of the Cartesian-
Newtonian epistemology that we have inherited from the Enlightenment and that 
still distorts and limits our intellectual constructions. In Sullivan’s view, 
Wordsworthians intent on rescuing the poet from the charge that his poetry is 
essentially subjective and expressionist have been hampered by the habit of bi-
nary conceptualization that structures so much thinking in a scientifically orient-
ed culture. Newtonian science introduces a split between the observer and the 
observed, between perceiving, valuing subjects on the one hand and a world of 
motion and matter on the other; this first and foremost creates a devastating rift 
between questions of value and those of knowledge. In Sullivan’s assessment, 
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Wordsworth perceived this rift and developed an opposed, experience-based 
epistemology to remedy the ill effects of instrumental reasoning. 
 Intriguingly, Sullivan suggests that an important key to understanding 
Wordsworth’s epistemology rests in the tradition of context-centered knowing 
that stems from the Sophists who, in contrast to Plato, emphasize praxis rather 
than theoria. Within this tradition, Sullivan singles out the philosopher Isocrates 
and the rhetorician Quintilian as central influences on the tradition of an alterna-
tive epistemology and, ultimately, on Wordsworth himself. The Sophist tradition 
stresses the evolution of knowledge within the context of human actions—
indeed, stresses that situations and contexts are inextricable from processes of 
knowing and acting—and this tradition continues into the present in the theories 
of Kenneth Burke and Gregory Bateson. Wordsworth’s model of knowledge, 
Sullivan maintains, is based on Quintilian rhetoric, which envisions “a continu-
um connecting perception, feeling, thinking, and acting” (10). 
 Chapter 7 of Sullivan’s book focuses specifically on the tradition of rhetoric 
stemming from Quintilian and on the likelihood that Wordsworth was directly 
influenced by the classical rhetorician’s view of knowledge. Unlike the domi-
nant tradition of philosophy, represented by Plato and characterized by the view 
that meaning and truth are prior to language, the tradition of rhetoric claims that 
meaning and truth are bound up with language. Quintilian’s rhetorical theory 
especially holds that experience and reflection as well as the development of 
feeling are central to rhetorical power, for these cultivate “habits of mind” which 
enable the individual to move others emotionally. Quintilian’s notion that well-
cultivated “habits of mind” form the core of powerful rhetoric parallels Words-
worth’s belief that such habits (rather than human reason) constitute the individ-
ual’s center of knowing. Instead of suggesting that “habits” be replaced by rea-
son, Wordsworth suggests that they be understood, in Sullivan’s words, as “The 
baseline for all decision-making and acting . . . that tuning and broadening 
should become a habit of mind in and of itself” (129)—in other words (and not 
unparadoxically), that cognitive flexibility should be cultivated as a valuable, 
central habit. Sullivan further surmises that the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads 
may be based on Quintilian’s discussion of extemporaneous speaking. In this 
discussion, Sullivan looks sensitively at Wordsworth’s use of the word “feeling” 
which, in the author’s account, is more likely synonymous with sensation and 
perception rather than emotion. Wordsworth should be judged as a rhetorical 
rather than a philosophical poet, one who places perception at the center of 
meaning and who develops a theory of composition rather than a poetics or theo-
ry of writing. 
 In his basic contention that Wordsworth’s “philosophy” has been funda-
mentally misunderstood as well as his more specific claims that align Words-
worth’s epistemology with the Sophists generally and with Quintilian’s theory 
of rhetoric in particular, Sullivan makes an important contribution to our under-
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standing of the poet’s thought. Whereas a number of scholars have become 
gradually more aware that, for instance, the complex structure of The Prelude 
has serious implications for how Wordsworth envisions the relationship between 
experience, thought, and meaning, none has framed this argument as an essen-
tially epistemological one, and none that I’m aware of cite and discuss Quintil-
ian as a likely influence. Ironically—since Sullivan’s thesis is about the primacy 
of experience, and this part of the book demonstrates intellectual influence—his 
argument is given much credence by this chapter on Quintilian, which is, in my 
view, the highpoint of the book. Another unusual and valuable feature of Sulli-
van’s book is the discussion throughout of Wordsworth’s letters and discursive 
writings, including the “Essay on Morals” and the famously misunderstood 
Preface. One wonders if Northrop Frye, who said that no one would give the 
Preface more than a B+ as a piece of Wordsworth criticism, would change his 
grade after reading Sullivan’s remarks.   
 Throughout the book, Sullivan makes connections between Wordsworth’s 
epistemology as he is elucidating it and the thought in our century of Kenneth 
Burke, David Bohm and, most particularly, Gregory Bateson. This aspect of the 
book is less successful than that which ties Wordsworth’s thinking to classical 
rhetoric. In claiming, for instance, that Bateson’s ecology of mind continues a 
tradition that begins with the Sophists and stems through Wordsworth, Sullivan 
is certainly correct; the trouble is that he has been very selective in the post-
Wordsworth thinkers he has chosen to discuss. With the waning of the Enlight-
enment, the failure of rationalism combined with the accumulated knowledge of 
our universe began a shift away from static conceptualizations toward an under-
standing that dynamic process shapes organisms, environments, experience, 
knowledge—that, well, dynamic process shapes everything. Intellectual culture, 
it would seem, begins to catch up to the Sophists by the turn of the nineteenth 
century, and numerous figures of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, not 
least among them Charles Darwin and the pragmatic philosopher William 
James, importantly prepare the way for Bateson’s ideas. Bateson’s ecology of 
mind is, in Sullivan’s words, “a view in which human minds are connected with-
in, and constituted by, larger mind-like processes of family, social structure, and 
the natural world” (81-82). In his recognition that human mental representation 
does not mechanically mirror reality but is the product of an ongoing, active 
process whereby human perceivers correct and adjust mental constructs through 
continuous perceptual feedback, Bateson is influenced by the dynamic models 
of systems science, which emerged in the 1950s and have enjoyed a broad, 
cross-disciplinary influence since that time. If systems science itself, then, grows 
out of a new tradition of thought that reaches back to Darwin, James, and 
Charles Lyell, among others, so, too, it reaches forward to contemporary fields 
like evolutionary epistemology and behavioral and environmental ecology. 
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 Sullivan’s treatment of the poetry is, in my view, too cursory—although at 
the same time I feel it’s somewhat unfair to make this criticism, since he has 
treated the discursive prose so sensitively and clearly. Yet it is with the poetry 
that Sullivan could best demonstrate his argument, since it is here that Words-
worth means to involve the reader in the experience of knowing, in overriding 
our “preestablished codes of decision.” In Chapter 8, “Poetry and Composing,” 
Sullivan claims that there are four models for reader participation in Words-
worth’s poetry—unfamiliar identification, mixed identification, shared re-
evaluation, and reflection on re-evaluation (153-54)—and then provides a read-
ing of the well-known lyric “We Are Seven,” asserting that this is an example of 
“mixed identification,” in which readers are not supposed to side with one point 
of view or the other. Yet surely by the poem’s conclusion readers are meant to 
lean toward the little girl’s point of view, even while they must recognize that 
her childish naïveté cannot be incorporated into an adult understanding of death. 
The adult male speaker who demands that she enumerate her siblings cannot 
understand that, unlike himself, the little girl doesn’t equate death with nonex-
istence, and his frustration and insensitivity in the final stanza of the poem come 
across as simultaneously funny, pathetic, and profoundly sad, as his outlook 
presages his own terrible struggles with loss: 
“But they are dead; those two are dead! 
Their spirits are in heaven!” 
’Twas throwing words away; for still 
The little Maid would have her will, 
And said, “Nay, we are seven!” 
This speaker is, in fact, deeply invested in the tradition of binary thought against 
which Sullivan pits Wordsworth’s interactive, experientially based epistemolo-
gy; indeed, both this reading and that of the paired lyrics “The Tables Turned” 
and “Expostulation and Reply” earlier in the book could make strong claims that 
Wordsworth is intentionally dramatizing the limitations of binary thought. 
 Sullivan is forthright in his moral claims in this book: the ongoing interac-
tion of the human mind and the entities outside it that results in knowledge that 
is, itself, continually being revised shapes a healthy, sustainable relation be-
tween humans and their several worlds, not least the natural one. On the other 
hand, the exaggerated tendency to dichotomize self and other, the inheritance of 
a scientific culture, is harmful in its artificial separation of the individual from 
all else. I find it refreshing that Sullivan is willing to claim that Wordsworth can 
teach us a better way of looking at ourselves and world, and I also think he is 
right. That said, Sullivan himself succumbs to some unnecessary binary concep-
tualizing in his implication that logically ordered argument, as the rhetorical 
mode of rationalist culture, repeats the damaging elements of this tradition. Sul-
livan takes pains to explain in both the introduction and the conclusion to his 
book that his strategy of organization is recursive because he wishes to involve 
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the reader in the epistemology that he is in the process of explicating. But Sulli-
van’s organizational strategy does not fundamentally alter the kind of book he is 
writing or the style he adopts—he is not attempting Paterian aesthetic criticism, 
nor is he writing a poem—and at times, in fact, he offers extremely logical tax-
onomies of types of poems or central points of key texts. The recursive tech-
nique is at times rather repetitive, and is apt especially to be so for romanticists 
who are generally well aware of the limitations of Enlightenment rationalism. In 
sum, to assume that the rational organization of an argument necessarily par-
takes of the worst aspects of Enlightenment thought is to oversimplify; separat-
ing the self from the object in rational contemplation need not necessarily op-
pose an experiential epistemology but can be, instead, part of the experience, 
part of the process of interactive engagement. 
 Sullivan’s book implies that, for individuals, knowledge is an ongoing pro-
cess, and the same can be said about humankind as well: over considerable peri-
ods of time, ideas come to be considered more or less valid not because of the 
charm of a particular contributor to the stream of ideas, but because other think-
ers have suggested like ideas that, furthermore, seem to account well for relevant 
outside facts. This is why Sullivan’s book is especially valuable. It joins the 
work of other Wordsworthians who have articulated the extent to which the po-
et’s work is rooted in dynamic cognitive processes, and in so doing lends added 
force to a renewed—perhaps a better—understanding of the poet.  
 
